OP-ED / WTO HONG KONG MINISTERIAL

Much ado about nothing

Despite the brouhaha about developing nations banding together, the Hong Kong declaration does not talk about reduction in domestic support in case of cotton. All it says is: “as an outcome of negotiations, trade distorting domestic subsidies for cotton production should be reduced," which in trade terms means practically nothing. In fact, the contentious issue of domestic support for agriculture has remained untouched. And that is where the US, EU and Japan have succeeded. They have emerged scathe-free from a negotiating position that could have otherwise derailed the Hong Kong Ministerial. Developing countries term this as a ‘success’.

Let us not forget that in the first three years of the notorious Farm Bill 2002, America provided an additional support of at least US $ 125 billion (70 per cent of the total allocated budgetary support of US $ 180 billion) to its estimated 9,00,000 farming families. These counter-cyclic payments, again considered non-trade distorting have already filled the bank accounts of the agri-business companies and the elite in the American society. And yet, the US is getting ready with another version of the Farm Bill that should come into vogue in 2007.

On top of it, there is no provision in the Hong Kong declaration that can stop the developed countries to further increase their agricultural subsidies. Under the July Framework 2004, developing countries have now legally permitted the developed countries to increase their agricultural subsidies.

When asked, India's Commerce Minister Kamal Nath replied: "The US has already offered to reduce domestic support by 53 per cent while the EU offer is for 70 per cent." This was actually a commitment that the US and EU had made in mid-October. Interestingly, the minister had then lashed out: “What the US proposed last month is not real cuts in agriculture subsidies. The real cuts would be when there is decline in the support provided by the US treasury,” he asserted.

But post-Hong Kong, for some strange reasons the minister agreed to the same commitment!

The US/EU offer pertained to cut the ceiling on trade-distorting subsidies by 60 per cent and 70 per cent, respectively. Let me clarify here that the US/EU proposal did not mean reduction in farm subsidies by 60 to 70 per cent but a reduction in the ‘ceiling’ on trade-distorting subsidies. As far as the overall reduction is concerned, it does not translate into any reduction in the domestic support being given.

Perhaps Kamal Nath thought that public memory is too short. Just in a matter of ten days, he made a complete u-turn in his stand on agricultural subsidies. This is exactly what he did at the time of accepting the July 2004 Framework, too. Two days before the final draft was accepted in Geneva in the early hours of August 1, 2004, he had publicly rejected it. And then, for reasons that remain unexplained, accepted the same draft (with hardly any changes) two days later and called it a ‘victory’ for India.

There is no denying that the biggest culprit is the July Framework 2004. It provides a cushion for the developed countries to raise farm subsidies from the existing level. It also is the foundation for future negotiations under the Doha Development Round. But if you read the draft carefully, it is obvious that the developing countries had been taken for a ride. The first instalment of a cut in subsidies by 20 per cent under the July Framework is not based on the present level of subsidies but on a much higher level that has been now authorized based on the three components -- the final bound total Aggregate Measure of Support (AMS), plus permitted de minimis, plus the Blue Box. In other words, developed countries have been allowed enough leverage by the developing countries to increase their subsidies. (See: Theatre of the absurd.)

How can the developing countries justify this? How could they forget that as long as the agricultural subsidies remain, protecting food and livelihood security in developing countries is not at all possible? And instead of re-opening the framework agreement, developing countries continue to negotiate on a faulty structure.

Allowing developing countries to select its own list of special products (SP), which would be outside the ambit of tariff reduction formula, along with special safeguard mechanisms (SSM) is being touted as adequate safeguard to protect farmers from income levels falling due to unfair competition from subsidised imports. SSM enables governments to raise import duties on agricultural products if there is a surge in imports or fall in world prices.

We need to understand this. Developed countries (38 rich countries so far) have used special safeguards (SSG) measures to restrict imports from developing countries. They have already been taking advantage of this flexibility by reserving the right to use the SSG for a large number of products: For e.g., Canada reserves the right to use SSG for 150 tariff lines, the EU for 539 tariff lines, Japan for 121 tariff lines, the US for 189 tariff lines, and Switzerland for 961 tariff lines.

For the EU, just using SSG for 20 tariff lines protects 40 per cent of their agriculture import market. By exercising the flexibility to designate 539 tariff lines under SSG, the EU has for all practical purposes blocked whatever can be imported from the developing world. A similar categorisation (20 tariff lines) in the US would provide a protective shield for 38 per cent of the imports. And the US reserves the right to use SSG for 189 tariff lines!

The only redeeming feature for the developing countries is that they too are allowed to use the same measures, and this is where these countries can assert on re-imposing tariffs and counter-veiling duties to meet food security concerns. These measures however are temporary and would only come in place after the importing countries have actually felt the after-shock of import surges.

Even so, this 'benevolence' is no justification for the developing countries to rejoice. Not all products or tariff lines can be protected under the SP category. The draft very clearly states that at present the offer is to classify anything between 1 to 20 per cent of the total tariff lines as special products. For a country like India, which grows 260 crops a year, and has 680 tariff lines in agriculture, not more than 60-80 tariff lines can be protected under the SP category. What would happen to the remaining 600 tariff lines? Each tariff line is linked to livelihoods of thousands of farmers.

Further, developed countries also have a similar provision under the July 2004 Framework. They can term some crucial commodities as 'sensitive' and thereby deny market access. For instance, the US, EU, Japan and Canada maintain tariff peaks of 350 to 900 per cent on food products such as sugar, rice, dairy products, meat, fruits, vegetables and fish, which can be easily brought under the category of ‘sensitive’ and some 25-40 of the sensitive tariff lines under the tariff rate quota can be easily protected under this category.

It is now abundantly clear that while the developing countries have got Special Products and SSM, the developed countries have almost an equal and parallel provision of Sensitive Products and SSG. Crucially, if the developed countries had felt satisfied with the two provisions – Sensitive Products and SSG – to protect their agriculture, there would have been no need to provide the monumental farm subsidy support. The fact that developed countries, adequately armed with the safeguard provisions (besides non-tariff barriers and phytosanitary measures), are still not willing to eliminate agricultural subsidies, clearly shows where the key to a fair trade in agriculture lies.

Unless agricultural subsidies in developed nations go, there is no way developing countries can escape the harmful impacts of cheaper and subsidised food surges. Highly subsidised imports from the developed countries have already done irreparable damage to the agricultural production potential of the developing countries. Between 1995 and 2004, Europe alone has been able to increase its agricultural exports by 26 per cent, much of it because of the massive domestic subsidies it provides. Each percentage increase in exports brings in a financial gain of US $ 3 billion.

On the other hand, a vast majority of the developing countries, whether in Latin America, Africa or Asia have in the first 10 years of WTO have turned into food importers. Millions of farmers have lost their livelihoods as a result of cheaper imports. If the WTO has its ways, and the developing countries fail to understand the prevailing politics that drives the agriculture trade agenda, the world will soon have two kinds of agriculture systems – the rich countries will produce staple foods for the world’s 6 billion plus people, and developing countries will grow cash crops like tomato, cut flowers, peas, sunflower, strawberries and vegetables. In reality, the WTO system may ensure that the reins of food security are passed into the hands of rich and developed countries -- back to the days of ‘ship-to-mouth’ existence. Developing countries have no one to blame, but themselves.

In sum, for the sixth time in a row, the trade ministers of the developing world – representing issue-based coalitions like G-20, G-33 and G-90 – have been duped to believe that trade is for development. Despite making loud noises, threatening and fuming over the injustice done to the poor and developing countries, the trade ministers of the G-110 countries, comprising the entire developing world, finally bowed before the rich and mighty.

We were made to believe that everyone cannot be befooled at all the times. Ten years after the World Trade Organisation (WTO) came into existence, and looking at the outcome of the sixth Ministerial Conference at Hong Kong, it is time to bury the age-old adage under the heaps of trade drafts.